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Overview
A key objective of this report is to identify commonalities across 
European countries in measures to protect and empower women 
from minority communities, with a view to beginning to map 
which policies are more and which less effective. Below is an 
overview of some of the common themes that emerge in the 
report, in terms of factors that can undermine initiatives on the 
one hand, and approaches that can enhance their effectiveness on 
the other. 
Factors that can undermine policy:
•  In many countries, immigration measures are the principal means of discouraging 
and preventing forced marriages – leading to potential confusion about the motives 
behind new regulations, a failure to tackle abuses with no overseas dimension, and a 
lack of credibility among members of minority communities. 
•  Distinctions between the different ‘practices’ and forms of violence discussed here are 
sometimes blurred under a single heading, such as ‘honour-based violence’. This makes it 
difficult to target policies effectively and risks stigmatising certain communities. 
•  At the same time, violence against women from minority communities is treated 
separately from ‘mainstream’ violence against women, often as part of race and 
immigration policy instead of as part of gender violence work. This feeds into a 
dichotomy between ‘emancipated’ European women and ‘oppressed’ Muslim or 
minority women.
•  The media plays an important role in drawing attention to violence against women, 
in particular by highlighting cases, but it sometimes does so in a sensationalist way 
and reinforces stereotypes. The cases chosen to highlight are often atypical.
•  The efforts and ongoing work of women in minority community organisations is 
often unrecognised, and women are inadequately represented and consulted in 
the formulation of policy initiatives that directly concern them. This means that 
public policy fails to make use of the experience and expertise that exists on the 
ground, lacks credibility and misses its targets. The current focus on Muslim women 
as victims rather than agents is particularly damaging to Muslim minorities, but 
also means that the specific needs of women in other minority groups may be 
overlooked.
•  A focus on religion and culture means that social and economic factors, power 
imbalances and institutionalised discrimination – all of which contribute to women’s 
marginalisation – are ignored. And while religion and culture are the focus of the 
initiatives discussed here, there is a lack of clarity about the distinction between 
them, which makes it difficult to identify and address root causes. For example, 
exemptions to gender equality requirements on religious grounds may go 
unchallenged if culture rather than religion is problematised.
•  Members of religious and cultural minorities continue to be portrayed in 
homogenizing ways. Essentialist views of cultural and religious identity remain 
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prevalent. In particular, there are few positive images of Muslim women and the 
hijab has become symbolic of the oppressive nature of Islam to many people in 
Europe.
•  Too great a focus on targeted laws at the expense of education and awareness-
raising work may not be the best way to tackle a problem – new laws are relatively 
cheap, but sometimes unnecessary and rarely enforced.
•  While the pivotal position of women in discourses about culture, religion and 
immigration is unrecognised, their role as mothers and in the home may mean they 
are blamed for failures of integration.
•  A discourse of gender equality is sometimes used to pursue an anti-immigration or 
Islamophobic agenda by those who have previously shown little interest in women’s 
rights.
Suggested approaches:
•  The women (and girls) who are most in need of protection from the forms of 
violence discussed here need to be involved and consulted in developing and 
implementing measures of protection and prevention. Women with direct experience 
of the issues in question should be empowered to drive the policy agenda. 
•  A balance needs to be struck between universally applicable and discrete policy 
initiatives. Violence against women from minority communities may be best 
addressed within a broad framework of women’s rights that is flexible enough to 
allow specific initiatives and research in particular areas. 
•  There is disagreement about the degree to which targeted legislation – for example 
on FGM/C or forced marriage – is useful. But there is general consensus that 
where legislation is a lever for change it needs to go hand-in-hand with adequately 
resourced educational and social services. 
•  Leading from this last point, researchers in all countries report a lack of adequate 
resources for civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) supporting 
Muslim and migrant women from minority communities at grassroots level. 
Increased and long term funding would help strengthen policy initiatives.
•  There is a noticeable lack of data on prevalence of the forms of violence discussed 
in this report. It is difficult, therefore, to assess the success of measures to reduce 
forced marriage, FGM/C or ‘honour’ crimes. Improved data collection and increased 
funding for research would be beneficial.
•  Clarity about the objectives of policy initiatives is crucial if the initiatives are to have 
credibility. Punitive measures are sometimes necessary, but the long-term goal is 
prevention, which means promoting a culture of respect for women’s rights. This 
is unlikely to happen if there is a perception that the underlying objective of new 
policies is to reduce immigration, for example. 
•  Following from this, a human rights framework can help to raise awareness of and 
prevent violence against women, and be used to promote core values, including in 
relation to women’s rights. 
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•  Socio-economic factors need to be included in the analysis and creation of initiatives 
to improve the position of minority women (and men). For many women from 
minority communities, unemployment, poor housing and racial discrimination are as 
significant as violence – if not more so – in determining the quality of life. 
•  Diversity within religious and cultural groups needs to be recognised, including 
diversity on the basis of age, gender and geographical location. This will help to 
challenge stereotypes. 
•  Recognition and analysis of the key role of gender would be useful; and the fact that 
it is issues concerning gender roles that are the point at which minority and majority 
rights are often perceived to conflict.
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As recently as the 1980s, women from minority religious and ethnic groups in Western 
European countries were not identified by policy-makers as a group in need of 
particular protection from specific forms of violence or abuse. They were more likely 
to be invisible as a target group and the specificity of their needs ignored. Today, most 
of the countries discussed in this report have laws, action plans and policies to tackle 
abuses experienced mainly by women and girls in immigrant, refugee or minority 
communities.i The same ‘practices’ have been identified as problematic across Europe 
– forced and arranged marriage, ‘honour’ based violence, female genital mutilation/
cutting, and wearing a hijab or headscarf. These practices are commonly identified 
with Muslim religion, tradition, or culture, though instances of forced marriage or 
‘honour’ based violence can be found across a wide range of religious and ethnic 
groups. While some of these practices are identifiable as forms of violence, it is also 
the case that language, dress and behaviour – once seen as private matters of choice 
– are now publicly contested.ii 
The issues that have captured public attention vary considerably from country to country, 
reflecting in part the different philosophies of integration, and the history and politics of 
those countries, but also the ‘accidents’ of what catches media attention. But while both 
issues and policy responses vary between countries, most parts of contemporary Europe 
face some version of these concerns. Despite national differences, there is often a striking 
similarity in approaches, trends and concerns. And while there have been cross-country 
comparisons on specific ‘practices’iii, we are not aware of any previous attempt to provide 
an overview of all these issues. Work on the relationship between gender equality and 
cultural diversity proceeds mainly at a country level, and language barriers mean that 
findings from one part of Europe are not easily available for researchers and policy makers in 
another. This report is a small step towards developing an overview and sharing experience. 
The starting point of this project and report was summed up at the opening of a 
conference in Amsterdam in June 2006: Respecting women’s rights need not mean 
disrespecting minority culture.iv The recent recognition by policy makers and legislators 
of the vulnerability of some women and girls in minority communities is a welcome 
development. At the same time, there are concerns about the kind of measures being 
adopted, the balance struck between enforcement and awareness-raising work, 
and the degree to which the individuals most directly affected by new initiatives are 
engaged in their formulation. Conference participants also drew attention to the way 
that a women’s rights discourse has been exploited by some politicians and the media 
to stigmatise minority communities, painting them as particularly oppressive to women 
while ignoring the violence experienced by white European women.v Violence against 
majority women was not confronted for many years because it was seen as a purely 
domestic concern and not the business of the state. The same is true of violence 
against minority women, but in addition a concern to be culturally sensitive and avoid 
charges of racism may have resulted in minority communities being left to govern 
themselves, making women within them particularly vulnerable. Participants in the 
conference recognised the danger of perpetuating stereotypes of minority communities, 
but there was a consensus that the solution is not to avoid discussing issues such as 
forced marriage and female genital mutilation, but to do so in an inclusive way aimed at 
protecting but also consulting and empowering those involved. 
Introduction 
5Gender equality, cultural diversity: European comparisons and lessons 
Background information
This report is the outcome of two conferences funded by the Nuffield Foundation in 
London in May 2005 and Amsterdam in June 2006. It builds on an earlier project and 
conference in October 2003 on ‘Gender and Cultural Diversity: European Perspectives’ 
(also funded by the Nuffield Foundation). Papers presented by participants from across 
Europe at the 2005 and 2006 conferences provide much of the source material for 
the report. The 2006 conference papers are listed as references and available online 
at www.fsw.vu.nl (see References below for details). It is intended that the conference 
papers will be presented in a special issue of a journal and/or book in 2008. 
By comparing some of the initiatives of recent years, this report attempts to map 
recent trends in Europe, suggest which approaches have been more and less successful 
in addressing gender-based violence in minority communities, and identify common 
areas of unmet need. The report’s main audience is UK policymakers working on these 
issues but it will be circulated more widely among women’s NGOs, service providers 
and researchers in Europe. The intention is that it will contribute to future cross-
European work. At the start of the project, there were few researchers addressing 
these issues across Europe countries; there is now greater evidence of collaboration.vi
The project organisers thank the Nuffield Foundation for supporting this project. The 
main source of information and ideas for this report is the papers given by participants 
at the June 2006 conference in Amsterdam, but the author is responsible for the 
arguments and any inaccuracies in the report. The author also thanks Barry Dustin for 
providing additional source material, and translation. 
This paper is written to inform UK policy, as well as cross-European initiatives. There 
are therefore significant multicultural issues in the countries discussed that are not 
mentioned, for example, the rights of Sami minorities in Norway and Sweden, because 
they do not have a direct correlation with UK experiences. There are also significant 
and relevant issues, such as polygamyvii and divorce,viii that are not covered because 
they relate primarily to jurisdiction rather than public policy and are beyond the 
scope of this report. These often concern the relationship between legal systems in 
the new or host country and the country of origin, where the risk is that women are 
unprotected under either system. 
As an overview of developments in several countries, this report inevitably omits many 
of the variations that exist within each country on the basis of geography, age, politics 
etc. In Belgium, with its Flemish/Walloon division, and in countries with a federal political 
structure such as Belgium and Germany, it is particularly difficult to identify a single 
national perspectiveix. But no country has a single voice or view in relation to the issues 
discussed here. The premise of the report is that countries, and also minority communities 
within them, are heterogeneous and ever-changing ‘units’. 
Acknowledgements 
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Context
The issues discussed in this report take place against the backdrop of post-9/11 
heightened concerns about terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, debates about 
the role of religion and the integration of Muslim minorities in Europe, a rapidly-
expanding European Community, and the interplay between national sovereignty, 
European law and international human rights instruments. In recent years, several 
countries have also seen a swing to power from socialist or centrist to conservative or 
populist political parties and this has been reflected in an increasingly anti-immigration 
rhetoric. Some basic statistics on migrant and Muslim populations in each country 
is provided at Appendix 2. This conflates two groups of people – the first identified 
by their immigration status, the second by their religion, but including many who 
have full citizenship status. While the immigrant communities that are the focus of 
multicultural debate differ from one country to the next – predominantly North African 
in France, Turkish in Germany and Austria, Pakistani in the UK – it is increasingly Islamic 
values and beliefs that have been perceived as a threat to democracy and European 
stability, and practices identified with Islam that have been perceived as oppressive 
to women.x This equation between Islam and women’s oppression is problematic, 
as is the unfortunate slippage between categories like ‘Muslim’, ethnic minority, and 
‘immigrant’ in political and media discourse. Many of those described as migrants have 
held full citizenship rights since birth; and the terminology of second or third generation 
migrants has been rightly criticised for the way it seems to problematise their citizenship. 
It has been difficult, however, to avoid entirely the blurring of identities in the report, 
particularly when it is both immigrants and Muslims that are currently seen as presenting 
a challenge to the fiction of a cohesive national identity. 
Throughout Europe there has been a gradual tightening of immigration controls since 
the 1980s, and in particular since the 1985 Schengen Agreement harmonising border 
controls among European Union member states. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 
defined immigration as a competency of the European Union. In most countries, it 
is now the case that family reunification and asylum are the main means of entering 
the country and acquiring permanent residence status.xi While most countries have 
an ageing population and recognise the need for migrant labour to supplement the 
existing workforce, the issue for politicians has been how to control the entry of 
migrants to meet specific economic needs without appearing in the eyes of the media 
and public to have an ‘open-door’ policy. In many countries, immigration policy has 
become confused with race and refugee issues and is exploited by politicians in the 
run up to elections where a manifesto commitment to tighten immigration is seen 
as a vote-winner. It is commonly assumed or argued that strict immigration controls 
facilitate good race relations; that by keeping most immigrants out, the few that are 
admitted will be able to integrate more easily.xii Many countries have seen a succession 
of new immigration laws over a few years.xiii Some of the countries discussed have 
not traditionally considered themselves countries of immigration – until recently, this 
would include the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany. In those that have considered 
themselves countries of immigration, like the UK, there is a similar pattern to the 
restrictions on immigration. There are limits on all entrants other than family reunion 
cases, skilled workers and asylum seekers; and attempts to address ‘abuses’ of the 
family reunion and asylum systems. 
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While multiculturalism, whether as a policy or simply a description of societies, was 
prevalent in Europe until the late 1990s, concerns about integration have meant the 
concept has been challenged. In most of the countries discussed here, there has been 
a new focus on integrative citizenship and what could be viewed as a shift back to 
assimilation. In some countries, it is suggested that multiculturalism has ‘failed’.xiv Policy 
makers, journalists and academics question the degree to which Muslim minorities in 
particular have integrated into mainstream society and share what are assumed to be 
widely accepted democratic and egalitarian values.xv Concerns about ‘parallel societies’ 
are evident in several countries, including Austria and Germany (‘Parallelgesellschaften’ 
is the German word for two culturally distinct populations living side by side without 
The role of cultural ‘insiders’ who become ‘outsiders’
While in general minority and Muslim women’s NGOs receive little 
credit for their work and little media attention, several individual 
women have taken a prominent role in drawing attention to the 
‘plight’ of Muslim women in the communities from which they 
themselves come. For example, Ayaan Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands 
and Necla Kelek in Germany have received a great deal of press 
coverage and are recognised as having helped to raise awareness 
of prevalence of FGM, forced marriage and ‘honour’ killing. While 
it is clearly a good thing that women with direct experience play 
a role in raising awareness, they are sometimes supported by and 
provide credibility to those with an anti-immigration agenda and 
little track record on gender equality. Prins and Saharso point 
out that before Hirsi Ali’s intervention, the position of Muslim 
women was not a part of criticisms of multiculturalism or Islam. 
It was Ali who made ‘the fruitful connection between the Dutch 
populist discontent about the (implicitly male) Islamic immigrant 
population and the difficult position of Muslim women. It must 
be admitted that Hirsi Ali succeeded where many other feminist 
politicians (who have been attempting for years to get problems 
of immigrant women on the political and policy agenda) failed.’clxx 
Both Kelek and Hirsi Ali have been criticised for their stereotyping 
and stigmatising of Muslim (and in Kelek’s case Turkish and 
Kurdish) communities. As women who became prominent for 
addressing culturally sensitive issues, they are often portrayed 
as brave individuals who have dared to speak out against their 
communities. They are not portrayed as members of their 
communities who reflect the diversity of opinion within it or  
held up as examples of successful integration. Rather they are 
often viewed as women who are lucky to have escaped their  
oppressive backgrounds.clxxi 
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mixing).xvi In the UK, the Cantle Report identified communities in which people live 
‘parallel lives’ – occupying the same physical space as their neighbours but having little 
contact with wider society.xvii
Most countries have now introduced a language requirement or citizenship test as 
part of their settlement packages.xviii (In light of the concerns of this report, it is worth 
noting that the compulsory language classes are often defended in explicitly gendered 
terms, the argument being that they will be particularly valuable to older women who 
might otherwise remain in domestic seclusion and enforced dependence on male 
family members.) Sweden is to some degree an exception in retaining more liberal 
citizenship laws. While the early 1990s saw a shift away from multiculturalism towards 
integration, the Swedish Citizenship Act of 2001 introduced dual citizenship. Where 
most countries were looking for ways to encourage their minority citizens to identify 
first and foremost as European, Sweden introduced legislation allowing its nationals to 
split their allegiance.xix Denmark is at the opposite end of the spectrum in moving from 
a liberal to a conservative immigration regime in the space of a few years.xx 
In most countries a shift has taken place. Up to the 1980s, multicultural rhetoric 
prevailed, including the belief that diversity was an inherently good thing and respect 
for different cultural and religious practices was desirable. That has been replaced 
by the recognition that difference can be problematic and attempts to find ways to 
promote shared values. This is particularly evident in the UK, where a Commission for 
Integration and Cohesion has been established to address issues including segregation 
and tensions between communities. Launching the Commission, the Minister 
responsible stated her belief that ‘we have moved from a period of uniform consensus 
on the value of multiculturalism, to one where we can encourage that debate 
[about who and what we are as a country] by questioning whether it is encouraging 
separateness’.xxi Other countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, have seen 
a sudden shift from a more tolerant, liberal immigration regime to a rejection 
of multiculturalism and focus on assimilation.xxii Meanwhile, in those that define 
themselves according to a discourse of universalism and equality (Sweden and France 
in very different ways), it may be difficult to construe ethnic and religious differences 
as anything but disadvantage or backwardness. 
There is also a European and international dimension to these topics. All the states 
discussed here, with the exception of Norway, are members of the European Union. 
All are members of the Council of Europe and the United Nations. All have signed 
up to or are bound by international treaties or documents that affirm human rights 
such as the right of individuals to choose their spouse and the right to family reunion.
xxiii There have been cross-European initiatives on forced marriage and ‘honour’ 
violence funded by the European Union and the Council of Europe.xxiv Decisions by the 
European Court of Human Rights have addressed the topics discussed here.xxv In the 
future, there may be an increasing number of perceived conflicts between different group 
rights, for example gender or gay rights and religious freedom, referred to the Court.
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Part 1: Legislative and policy initiatives
This section identifies specific ‘practices’ that have been subject to 
policy or legislative initiatives in recent years and the way that they 
have been addressed.
Forced marriage
Forced (and sometimes arranged) marriage has been identified as a problem across 
Europe in the past two decades, and the ‘protection’ of young people from forced 
marriage has become closely intertwined with restrictive immigration policies. A forced 
marriage has been defined as ‘one where people are coerced into a marriage against 
their will and under duress’.xxvi However, a Council of Europe study defines it more 
broadly as:
‘[A]n umbrella term covering marriage as slavery, arranged marriage, traditional 
marriage, marriage for reasons of custom, expediency or perceived respectability, child 
marriage, early marriage, fictitious, bogus or sham marriage, marriage of convenience, 
unconsummated marriage, putative marriage, marriage to acquire nationality and 
undesirable marriage – in all of which the concept of consent to marriage is at issue’.xxvii
As this suggests, there is a lack of clarity about the precise target of forced marriage 
initiatives and the difference between forced and arranged marriages. Research 
among South Asian communities in North East England has shown that most people 
perceive a difference between the two, viewing arranged marriages as positive, but 
it also suggests some overlap between the two categories (as well as overlap with 
the notion of a love marriage).xxviii In the UK, the Government has been keen to stress 
that while forced marriage is a human rights abuse, arranged marriages in which both 
partners choose to participate are an accepted and acceptable cultural practice. The 
subject became topical because of the coincidence in 1999 of three high profile cases: 
the murder of Rukhsana Naz by her brother and mother after she left an arranged 
marriage and became pregnant by another man; the plight of ‘Jack and Zena Briggs’, 
forced into hiding by bounty-hunters employed by Zena’s family after she refused to 
marry a cousin in Pakistan; and the successful return to England of a young Sikh girl, 
KR, who was made a ward of court when her parents abducted her to India for the 
purposes of marriage. The total number of forced marriages remains unclear, though 
the number frequently cited is of 1,000 young people forced into unwanted marriages 
each year. Following the establishment in 1999 of a Working Group on Forced 
Marriage,xxix a Community Liaison Unit was set up in the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO), charged with dealing with the so-called ‘overseas dimension’ of forced 
marriage. An initial criticism of the initiative was its location in the Foreign Office 
and emphasis on cases involving a foreign spouse. The danger was that cases of 
forced marriage involving two UK citizens and/or residents were ignored. The unit 
was recently re-launched as a joint Home Office/FCO unit but remains located in the 
Foreign Office rather than alongside the Home Office’s work on domestic violence.xxx
In contrast to the UK, Denmark’s 2003-2005 Action Plan targets ‘Forced, quasi-
forced and arranged marriages’, all of which are identified with the oppression of 
women. The Plan contains 21 initiatives to ‘prevent forced marriages’ and ‘discourage 
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unhappy family reunifications based on arranged marriages’.xxxi The Plan’s main focus 
is prevention and awareness raising through information, dialogue and cooperation, 
counselling, providing residential facilities, and research. However, the failure to 
separate forced and arranged marriages is problematic in a number of ways. It ignores 
the diversity in forms of arranged marriage, it idealises ‘normal’ Danish families in an 
unrealistic way, and it ignores the complexity of generational and gender issues in 
minority families by simply ascribing all women as victims of their culture. Empirical 
work in Denmark suggests a more complex picture.xxxii 
There is disagreement in Europe as to whether the problem of forced marriage is 
increasing or has simply been hidden until recently.xxxiii Awareness of the problem has 
usually been a result of a combination of media reports and NGO activities. Writers 
from the Netherlands and Belgium have identified the way ‘import brides’ in these 
countries are confused with victims of forced marriage.xxxiv Sometimes sensational 
newspaper reports of particularly shocking cases – such as that of ‘Jack and Zena 
Briggs’ in Britain – have drawn attention to a problem that ethnic and religious 
minority women’s organisations have been struggling for years to highlight. In Austria, 
attention was partly drawn to the issue by a television documentary by the Austrian 
Broadcasting Company in 2005 in which the NGO Orient Express showed forced 
marriage as a threat to young women of Turkish, Kurdish and/or Muslim backgrounds 
living in Austria. But it was also put on the agenda when Maria Rauch-Kallat, Secretary 
of State for Women’s Affairs, announced it as a priority for Austria’s EU presidency in 
2006.xxxv In Germany, the 2005 book ‘Die Fremde Braut’ (‘the Foreign/Alien Bride’) by 
Necla Kelek is credited with bringing the issue into the open along with the ‘honour’ 
murder of a young woman with Kurdish family background in Berlin in February 
2005, who had liberated herself from a forced marriage. The book was the cause 
of controversy, with critics of the way it stigmatised Islamic and Turkish communities 
writing an open letter to the German weekly newspaper ‘Die Zeit’ in 2006.xxxvi In 
Norway, a key event was the abduction of Nadia, a Norwegian national taken to 
Morocco in 1997 by her family to be forced into marriage (it was assumed).xxxvii
Several countries have introduced action plans or packages of initiatives to tackle the 
problem. Typically, these combine awareness-raising and educational measures (to reduce 
prevalence), services in terms of housing and social care (to help current victims), and 
punitive measures (to punish the perpetrators and send a clear message of unacceptability). 
As well as the UK and Denmark, Sweden and Norway both have action plans on forced 
Adam and Asmaa
In Denmark, the television chat show ‘Adam and Asmaa’ has been 
criticised because one of its hosts, Asmaa Abdol-Hamid, wears a 
headscarf. Vibeke Manniche, head of the Women for Freedom 
Association, has petitioned to have the programme taken off the 
air. ‘The choice of Asmaa as a co-host is an insult to Danish and 
Muslim women,’ said Manniche. ‘She sends the message that an 
honorable woman can’t go out unless she’s covered up’.clxxii
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marriage. In Sweden, the emphasis is on prevention rather than enforcement and the plan 
targets the ‘oppression of girls in patriarchal families’ rather than specific practices.xxxviii
Norway’s approach to forced marriage is also illustrative of a shifting climate. Its first Action 
Plan on Forced Marriages was published in December 1998 and was partly a response to 
the case of Nadia, as well as to NGO and media pressure. The plan discusses the difference 
between arranged and forced marriage and focuses on prevention and dialogue with 
relevant minority groups. It led to the establishment of a telephone helpline run by the 
Oslo Red Cross. The Plan was unusual in that there was no attempt to use legislation 
or harsher immigration regulations to tackle the problem. In fact it considers addressing 
forced marriage by relaxing immigration controls, for example, by offering victims 
continued residence after a marriage annulment.
Less than five years later, and after the murder in Sweden of Fadime Sahindal 
which had a huge impact in many Northern European Countries, the Norwegian 
Government published its ‘Renewed Initiative against Forced Marriage’ in 2002. This 
contained 30 new measures and though it continued to prioritise work with women’s 
NGOs, there were also ten law-related actions. These included the right to institute 
legal proceedings to establish the validity of a marriage without the agreement of 
either spouse and an amendment to the Children’s Act to invalidate child marriages 
contracted by parents. In 2003 the Penal Code was amended to include a specific 
subsection on forced marriage and a mandatory prosecution provision in cases of forced 
marriage, with or without the victim’s consent (similar to the provision for domestic 
violence cases). In March 2004 it was announced that all would-be immigrants seeking 
residence in Norway would have to sign a declaration confirming that they understood 
that forced marriages and female circumcision were forbidden under Norwegian law.xxxix 
Most countries do not have a specific crime of forcing someone into marriage. It is 
usually argued that this is unnecessary. According to all national laws and international 
treaties, marriage is based on individual consent, therefore a forced marriage is by 
definition invalid.xl Moreover, forcing somebody into marriage usually involves other 
criminal offences that can be used to convict the perpetrator, such as abduction, 
kidnapping, rape and various crimes of violence. However, there is evidence of a 
trend towards criminalization of forced marriage. The Council of Europe study ‘Forced 
marriages in Council of Europe member states’ recommends a specific offence of 
‘forced marriage’.xli Norway has specifically prohibited forced marriage through an 
amendment to the Penal Code.xlii In Austria, a new provision makes forcing somebody 
to marry a case of grievous compulsion punishable by up to five years imprisonment, 
and forced marriage is now a crime against personal autonomy, to be prosecuted by 
the state rather than at the request of the individual.xliii In Germany, an amendment 
to the Criminal Code in 2005 defines forced marriage as a particularly serious case 
of duress with a sentence of up to five years.xliv The German Bundesrat (Federal 
Council) passed a bill in February 2006 making forced marriage a sui generis offence 
and allowing forced marriages to be more easily annulled – a measure yet to be 
approved by the German parliament.xlv In 2005, the French working group Femmes de 
l’Immigration proposed criminalisation of forced marriage.xlvi
12
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A common problem with criminalisation is that it depends on affected parties bringing 
charges against their own families, which few wish to do. Regina Kalthegener from 
the German NGO Terre des Femmes has said she does not expect many complaints 
to be made.xlvii In the UK, a young woman who had been kidnapped said in court 
that she was now reconciled to her family and did not want her stepfather or his co-
accused prosecuted.xlviii 
The UK has recently debated taking the path of criminalisation. The government 
conducted a consultation exercise in 2006 to ask whether it should create a specific 
criminal offence of forcing someone into marriage.xlix A cross-section of women’s 
groups led by Southall Black Sisters responded to the consultation in the negative, 
but within black and Asian women’s organisations there is a diversity of views with 
some, like FORWARD, in favour of a specific law. While senior police officers initially 
supported a new law, the consultation response showed mixed views and the 
Government announced that it does not at present plan to introduce a new law.l Many 
women’s groups, including those representing women from minorities, support calls 
on the Government to develop an integrated ‘joined-up’ strategy on violence against 
women.li
Some countries have gone further and criminalised marriages of convenience. In 
France as of November 2003, public prosecutors can investigate suspected cases 
of marriages of convenience.lii The Belgian Marriages of Convenience Act of 1999 
requires registrars to notify public prosecutors where there is doubt about a spouse’s 
consent or the intention to live together as a married couple. In 2004, the Chamber 
of Representatives introduced a draft resolution to further prevent marriages of 
convenience through measures such as a database of cases.liii Austria fines spouses 
who marry without intending to live together as a married couple or with knowledge 
that the foreign partner’s objective it to gain citizenship. A law has been proposed at 
national level in Belgium making bogus marriage punishable by taking away nationality 
for those who have become Belgian through marriage.
Family reunification, residency and citizenship
Immigration law does not only provide the context for the ‘problems’ discussed in this 
report, it is also a means of addressing them through changes to the regulations on 
family reunification,liv residency and citizenship. While the European Union’s Family 
Reunification Directive entitles third country nationals with a minimum of a one-year 
residence permit to reunion with spouses and children, Denmark, the UK and Ireland 
have opted out of the Directive. Denmark’s Alien’s Act of 2000 removed family 
reunification as a right and each case is now assessed on an individual basis. The age 
bar for individuals who wish to be joined by spouses from abroad has been raised to 
24 (the legal age of marriage in Denmark is 18, or 16 with a letter of approval from 
the Queen). In addition, a new rule means that permission will not be given if there 
is doubt that one or both parties consented to the marriage. The Danish spouse must 
also have accommodation, there is a financial threshold, and both partners must have 
closer ties with Denmark than with any other country and cannot be cousins. 
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Denmark’s initiative has been criticised internally and internationally, including by 
CEDAW (The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women), which 
has ‘urged Denmark to consider revoking this legislation’, and nationally by the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights as likely to lead to violations of the right to family life.lv It 
has been viewed as a reversal of the normal burden of proof in that spouses have to 
demonstrate their marriage is freely contracted.lvi The strategy can also be criticised 
because it unfairly discriminates against minority groups by effectively imposing a 
higher age for marriage with the spouse of their choice than applies to the majority of 
the population. And it gives rise to concerns that the main motive – rather than a by-
product of the initiative – is reducing immigration through family reunion. It may also 
be believed to enhance integration based on the belief that ‘import brides’ obstruct 
this process.
Despite these arguments, while Denmark’s age limit of 24 is the extreme, other 
countries have followed suit. The UK has raised the age limit for sponsoring a spouse’s 
entry to 18lvii (The Member of Parliament Ann Cryer who instigated the change has 
argued that the limit should be raised further to 21), while 16 is the age at which 
individuals can normally marry with parental permission. In Norway, as of 2003, a 
citizen bringing a foreign spouse into the country must demonstrate that s/he can 
provide for him/her where one of them is under the age of 23. The government 
consultation document recognised that the policy could have the alternative effect to 
that intended in leading to girls being taken out of school to earn money to finance 
their husbands’ entry, but ultimately rejected this argument.lviii The Netherlands has 
increased the age at which a Dutch resident or citizen can bring in a foreign partner 
from 18 to 21 and there are also financial requirements.lix In January 2006, the German 
Home Office initiated reforms of the migration law to implement European Union 
directives concerning right of residence and asylum law. The draft bill includes the 
requirement for foreign brides (from outside the European Union) to learn German 
before their arrival and bars entry to those under 21.lx In June 2006 the Commission 
for Family, Seniors, Women and Youth of the German parliament organised a 
hearing on a draft bill making forced marriage an element of an offence sui generis. 
Necla Kelek, in her expert’s report provided for the hearing, also supported the 
government’s plans to increase the age of marriage to a foreign partner.lxi There are 
concerns about the discriminatory effect of this age regulation and its constitutionality.lxii
The argument usually given for this policy is that raising the age at which a European 
national can sponsor the entry of a spouse makes it easier for the young people 
concerned to withstand parental pressure and reject an unwanted marriage. It is also 
assumed that forced marriages often take place between girls/women from minority 
communities with European nationality and partners from the girls’ country of origin 
in order for the husband to acquire European nationality and circumvent immigration 
laws. The implication is that marriages between a European national and a non-
national may not be ‘genuine’ and may involve violence against women. Denmark’s 
forced marriage action plan states that over half the women from non-Danish 
backgrounds who contact crisis centres are family reunification immigrants.lxiii 
There is no evidence that this strategy works because these policies are fairly recent 
and because of the difficulty of measuring the number of forced marriages that 
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have not taken place. But it has been claimed that the policy is not effective in 
preventing forced marriages.lxiv And it has been suggested that raising the age limit for 
sponsorship could have a negative outcome in encouraging parents to send underage 
girls abroad to be married and return to Europe with their spouse when they are old 
enough, thereby putting them out of reach of educational and social services and at 
greater risk of harm.lxv By the time they return to Europe, they may have spent several 
years in an unwelcome marriage.lxvi 
A further immigration issue that mainly affects women – this time from the opposite 
perspective, where the woman is the sponsored party or ‘import bride’ – is the time that 
a couple have to live together before the sponsored party has independent residency 
or citizenship rights. In many countries, NGOs have pointed out that women who are 
dependent on their husbands for their immigration status are particularly vulnerable to 
violence and will find it difficult to leave while they are unable to stay in the country in 
their own right.
In Britain, the newly elected Labour Government abolished the much-criticised 
Primary Purpose Rule in 1997. This had required those applying for entry clearance 
for an overseas fiancé(e) or spouse to prove that the primary purpose of the intended 
marriage was not to obtain permission to enter the UK. There is no known ‘primary 
purpose’ case involving two white spouses, and the rule was widely perceived as 
racist. However, it is now the case that women joining a spouse from overseas must 
live in the UK for at least two years before becoming eligible to remain in their own 
right, making it difficult for them to leave a violent relationship or indeed a forced 
marriage. A ‘domestic violence concession’ grants Indefinite Leave to Remain to a woman 
who can prove the breakdown of her marriage through violence, but the standard of 
proof is high and women applying under this concession still have no recourse to public 
funds until their immigration status is resolved, and may well have no-one to turn to 
for help with temporary accommodation or financial or emotional support. Women’s 
organisations argue that the concession has had limited success.lxvii
A similar situation exists elsewhere: migrants entering Austria under family reunion – 
mainly women – are only entitled to an independent residence permit after five years’ stay. 
Foreign wives whose husbands die or who are divorced, where the sponsoring spouse is 
found predominantly guilty of the marriage’s failure, do not lose their residence permit. 
There is also a concession for victims of domestic violence.lxviii In the Netherlands there is 
a three-year waiting period before a foreign spouse can acquire independent residence 
status.lxix In Germany and Sweden the period is two years and there is a concession for 
victims of domestic violence. In Norway, it is possible to apply for permanent residence 
after three years, with an exception of one year for women who are victims of spousal 
violence.lxx While many countries therefore have exemptions for victims of domestic 
violence, it is often difficult to meet the required standard of proof and women may be 
unaware of the concession.
While most packages or plans to protect women abused through marriage include 
education, information and dialogue, these have not had a high profile. Changes to 
immigration rules are at the forefront of most countries’ strategies risking a lack of 
clarity about the true purpose of these initiatives. While protecting victims of forced 
marriage may be the stated aim, reducing family reunification entries often appears to 
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be a welcome side effect. The impression given by the focus on immigration or ‘the 
overseas dimension’ can be that the main aim of these initiatives is a reduction in the 
incidence of transnational marriages or even of transnational identities.lxxi 
‘Honour’
‘Honour’-related violence, crimes committed in the name of honour, or ‘honour’ 
crimes have been defined in various ways but usually as a broad category of crimes 
of violence committed against women and girls (and sometimes men and boys). An 
‘honour’ crime tends to be differentiated from other forms of domestic violence or 
killing on the grounds that it involves a premeditated act to restore family honour, 
and that the perpetrators may be fathers or cousins or uncles, rather than partners 
or husbands.lxxii Along with forced marriage, there has been much discussion of 
‘honour’ violence across Europe. In fact forced marriage (and sometimes female 
genital mutilation/cutting) is often discussed as a subcategory within ‘honour crimes’. 
Austria for example, has launched a Network against Harmful Traditions (NAHT) that 
encompasses ‘honour’ crimes, forced marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM).lxxiii 
It is therefore not always easy to separate initiatives on ‘honour’ from those on forced 
marriage and FGM. This section focuses on ‘honour’ killings and abductions as forced 
marriage has been discussed above and FGM is considered below. 
In contrast to ‘crimes of passion’ – and they often are contrasted – committed by an 
individual man on the spur of the moment usually in the face of rejection by a woman, 
‘honour’ crimes are typically portrayed by observers and perpetrators as committed 
with premeditation and with the support of the community. Where ‘passion’ is often 
seen as a mitigating factor in women’s murders – in the UK, for example, it can lead to 
the lighter sentence of manslaughter on the basis of provocation – ‘honour’ has rarely 
been seen as a valid excuse in European courts. While feminists in North America 
have expressed concern at the successful deployment of a ‘cultural defence’ to defend 
men from minority communities who kill women,lxxiv this is not a phenomenon that 
has occurred on any scale in Europe. A greater concern is the possibility of a double 
standard that distinguishes white and European ‘crimes of passion’ from Muslim, Asian or 
Middle-Eastern ‘crimes of honour’, with passion treated as a mitigating and honour as an 
aggravating factor.
As with forced marriage, ‘honour’ related violence often comes to light when one or 
several shocking crimes are highlighted in the media, acting as a national ‘wake-up’ call 
in exposing a hitherto unacknowledged form of violence or killing. This was the case 
in Sweden, which has been at the forefront of work in this area. In the 1990s, three 
‘honour’ killings of girls or women of Kurdish origin in Sweden ‘touched a nerve’lxxv 
in society and caused Sweden to lead the way in initiatives in this area, including at 
European level.lxxvi Sara Maisam Abed Ali was murdered by her teenage brother and 
cousin in 1998, Pela Atroshi was murdered in Iraq by her father and three uncles in 
2002, Fadime Sahindal was killed by her father in 2002 when she refused to marry 
the man chosen for her. She had previously brought charges of threatening behaviour 
against her father and brother. Fadime’s murder, in particular, introduced the concept 
of ‘honour killings’ to Sweden and she became a symbol of resistance to traditional 
patriarchal culture.lxxvii The murders were seen as evidence of the failure of integration 
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policies and also as damaging to Sweden’s image of itself. They have been perceived 
as a ‘blight, an intolerable occurrence in a country ranked as the most gender equal 
in the world by UN measures and in a country in which feminists in government 
envisioned themselves as the vanguard of women’s emancipation’.lxxviii Two days 
after Fadime’s murder, a parliamentary session debated integration. A unanimously 
agreed protocol was issued stating that culture and religion never excuse honour 
related violence. A budget of 180 million SEK has been allocated for preventative and 
educational measures, including school programmes. In November 2003, the Swedish 
Minister of Democracy and Integration Issues convened an expert meeting on violence 
committed in the name of honour; a police expert on ‘honour’-related violence was 
appointed in 2002 (now withdrawn); and there has been a move towards harsher 
sentencing, including for crimes committed abroad. 
Sweden has been the base for a cross-European project on ‘Honour-Related Violence’ 
initiated by an NGO called Kvinnoforum with support from the European Union 
(Daphne Project), based on the creation of a knowledge base and sharing of good 
practice. An international conference was held in Stockholm in 2004, culminating in 
‘The Stockholm Declaration to combat honour related violence in Europe’.
In Germany, it was also the coincidence of several cases that raised public concern, 
with six in Berlin in the period October 2004-February 2005. The last of these was 
particular significant in raising public awareness: Hatun Sürücü, of Turkish/Kurdish 
origin, divorced the cousin she was forced to marry at 16 and was reportedly dating 
a German man when she was murdered at the age of 23 by her brother. What 
particularly shocked the public, however, were the reports of male students at a local 
school who commented that ‘she deserved what she got – the whore lived like a 
German’ and ‘she only had herself to blame’.lxxix Germany is one of the few countries 
where there have been concerns that a cultural relativist position has led to milder 
sentences for ‘honour’ killings than for other murders. In the Sürücü case, two of the 
three brothers accused were found not guilty and Seyran Ates, a Turkish-German 
lawyer and activist, expressed concern that a negative message was being sent to 
women experiencing similar family violence.lxxx However, in the past two years, the 
more common legal position has been that the perpetrator’s cultural background is 
not deemed relevant to the case.lxxxi 
Government and non-state actors in other countries have also identified ‘honour’ 
violence as a new problem that needs to be addressed. In 2004, the Netherlands NGO 
TransAct began a ‘National Platform Against Honour Related Violence’ to exchange 
information and expertise and develop collaboration. Members of the Platform meet 
three times a year and come from both the statutory and voluntary sector. In 2005, 
the Dutch cabinet designated ‘honour related violence’ as a ‘large project’ with the 
cabinet required to report periodically to the Chamber on progress in tackling it.lxxxii 
In the UK until recently, the main Government initiative was on forced marriage, 
with most work on ‘honour’ violence carried out by academics and NGOslxxxiii but 
the Metropolitan Police has now taken the lead in this area. The immediate catalyst 
for this work was extensive media coverage in 2002 of the murder of a 16-year-old 
Turkish Kurdish girl, Heshu Yones, killed by her father after he learnt of her affair 
with a Lebanese Christian man. Sentencing the father to life imprisonment, the judge 
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described the case as ‘a tragic story arising out of irreconcilable cultural differences 
between traditional Kurdish values and the values of western society’.lxxxiv Other cases 
include that of Anita Gindha, who was found strangled in 2003, and Sahda Bibi 
who died of stab wounds on her wedding day in 2003, both widely reported in the 
newspapers as ‘honour crimes’, helping to make this a newly visible form of violent 
crime. 
In the last two years, ‘honour-based violence’ has become a new focus of police 
activity in Britain, and initiatives to tackle forced marriage, and to a lesser degree FGM, 
have been increasingly incorporated under this broader heading. In January 2003, 
following pressure from women’s organisations, and a Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS) report on domestic violence that identified ‘honour killings’ as an important 
area for future work, the MPS set up the Strategic Homicide Prevention Working 
Group on ‘Honour Killings’ covering London. A second, national group is now 
developing a training package for all police forces in the country.lxxxv In June 2004, it 
was announced that Scotland Yard detectives are re-examining 109 possible ‘honour’-
related killings, many involving women from South Asian communities killed between 
1993-2003. Many of these cases have already been ‘solved’ and one of the purposes is 
to look at these crimes afresh to identify common features of ‘honour’ crimes in order 
to prevent future murders. 
Strategies to tackle ‘honour’ crime (like forced marriage, which the category ‘honour’ 
often includes) consist of both preventative and punitive measures, with recognition 
that awareness-raising in the communities concerned must play a key role. There 
has been no suggestion in any of the countries discussed here that ‘honour’ crimes 
be made a specific category within the legal system. In policy terms however, they 
tend to be treated apart from ‘mainstream’ violence against women. One problem is 
definitions of domestic violence, which traditionally focus on partners and ex-partners, 
while ‘honour’ killings are often committed by male (and sometimes female) relatives. 
In Belgium, for example, the current National Action Plan against Partner Violence 
(2004-2007) focuses solely on partner and ex-partner violence and in fact uses a 
‘Honour is to fight for my sister’s freedom’
In Germany, postcard campaigns by activists and NGOs have been 
used to highlight forced marriage and ‘honour’ killings. Two young 
Berlin Turkish boys had themselves photographed for the campaign 
under the slogan ‘Honour is to fight for my sister’s freedom’. 20,000 
postcards were printed and circulated at the beginning of 2005. 
In future postcards will also be printed in Arabic and Turkish and 
distributed selectively in male domains such as cafes and sports clubs. 
A poster campaign is also planned. The boys have been applauded as 
everyday heroes by one newspaper. In the summer of 2005, Inssan, a 
Muslim cultural association, also started a postcard campaign against 
forced marriages, distributing 4,000 postcards to mosques, town halls, 
adult education centres and cafes.
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narrower frame of reference than the previous plan.lxxxvi In the UK, many women’s 
NGOs use the acronym VAW (Violence Against Women) rather than domestic 
violence, as a term that can better encompass the range of violence that women from 
majority and minority communities experience.lxxxvii 
Female genital mutilation/cutting
Female genital mutilation (FGM), female genital cutting (FGC) and female circumcision 
are the terms used to describe the cutting, alteration or removal of part of a woman’s 
or girl’s genitalia for non-therapeutic reasons. Most definitions also include the 
fact that it is a ‘traditional’ practice or done for ‘cultural’ reasons. While it has been 
described as a religious and more specifically an Islamic practice, commentators are 
keen to point out that it is not a requirement of any of the major world religions, 
and not practised in most of the Muslim world. Material on FGM/C often starts with 
a definition of the kinds of surgery that are carried out, usually using a typology of 
different procedures based on that given by the World Health Organisation: 
•  Type I – excision of the prepuce, with or without excision of part or all of the clitoris;
•  Type II – excision of the clitoris with partial or total excision of the labia minora;
•  Type III – excision of part or all of the external genitalia and stitching/narrowing of 
the vaginal opening (infibulation);
•  Type IV – pricking, piercing or incising of the clitoris and/or labia; stretching of the 
clitoris and/or labia; cauterization by burning of the clitoris and surrounding tissue;
•  scraping of tissue surrounding the vaginal orifice (angurya cuts) or cutting of the 
vagina (gishiri cuts);
•  introduction of corrosive substances or herbs into the vagina to cause bleeding or for 
the purpose of tightening or narrowing it; and any other procedure that falls under 
the definition given above.lxxxviii 
While the practice is recognised as existing in Western European countries as a result of the 
arrival of immigrant and refugee communities from countries where FGM/C takes place, 
the level of prevalence in Europe is not known. Although NGOs such as FORWARD in the 
UK and GAMS in France have worked on the issue for many years, the subject has not had 
as high a profile as ‘honour’ killings and forced marriage. This is no doubt partly due to the 
difficulty in identifying cases and the related lack of media reports. 
Several countries have laws specifically outlawing FGM: Sweden (1982 legislation), 
Norway (1998), the UK (1985 and 2003) and Belgium (2000). Sweden’s Act against 
Female Mutilation includes the prosecution of parents taking their children abroad 
to be circumcised. In July 2006 a Somali father was jailed for four years for forcing 
his 13-year-old daughter to be circumcised during a visit to Somalia in 2001. This 
was the first prosecution in Sweden since the 1982 legislation and was a result of 
an amendment to the law in 1999 to allow prosecution of parents for taking their 
children abroad to be circumcised. In Norway, an additional act was added to the 
General Civil Penal Code in 1995, again covering Norwegian citizens and residents 
taken abroad for circumcision.lxxxix The Act was followed by a ‘Governmental Action Plan 
Against Female Genital Mutilation for 2001-2003’ by the Ministry of Children and Family 
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Affairs.xc In the UK, the 1985 Female Circumcision Act was replaced by the 2003 Female 
Genital Mutilation Act which had two main aims: to replace the term ‘circumcision’ with 
‘mutilation’, stressing the harmful nature of the practice; and to make the practice illegal 
even when carried out overseas.xci In the UK and Belgium, despite new legislation, there 
have been no prosecutions for FGM/C. 
Elsewhere it has been argued that there is no need for specific legislation as FGM/C is 
covered in the general criminal code. For example, in Austria, the Secretary of State for 
Justice stated in 1996 that there was no need to criminalise FGM as it was punishable 
as ‘physical injury with grievous lasting consequences’. But after further parliamentary 
interventions the penal code was amended to make consent to genital mutilation irrelevant 
(excluding male circumcision, genital piercing or transsexual and intersexual cases).xcii
Recognising the difficulty of identification and prosecution of cases, the focus in most 
countries has been on providing information and education, and often as part of wider 
work on violence against women and girls in minority communities. FGM/C in Austria 
has been addressed as part of an initiative to combat ‘harmful traditions’ which focuses 
on forced marriage, FGM and ‘honour’-based violence. As part of this initiative an 
expert meeting on FGM was held in November 2005, a study has been commissioned, 
and there has been a recommendation that information about FGM is included in the 
curricula for the training of gynaecologists and paediatricians.xciii In 2005, women from all 
parties introduced a parliamentary petition for resolution including the establishment of 
an International Commemoration Day on ‘this unimaginably cruel ritual’.xciv 
In the Netherlands, FGM/C was put on the political agenda by the Dutch-Somali 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s impact on Dutch politics
Dutch-Somali Ayaan Hirsi Ali was elected as Member of 
Parliament for the Liberal Conservative party (VVD) in 2003. 
She is known for her criticisms of Islam as oppressive to woman 
and has raised issues including forced marriage and female 
genital mutilation – where she suggested yearly medical checks 
on girls from high-risk communities as a means of tackling the 
problem. In the summer of 2004 she made a short film with 
filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, ‘Submission I’, denouncing sexual 
violence against Muslim women and showing lines from the 
Koran inscribed on a woman’s body. The film was viewed as 
blasphemous by some Muslims, Van Gogh was assassinated 
in November 2004 and Hirsi Ali went into hiding. In 2006 she 
stepped down as Member of Parliament when charges that she 
had lied to acquire Dutch citizenship were publicised. The irony 
of Hirsi Ali falling foul of the strict immigration and asylum rules 
she supported has been noted. She subsequently moved to the 
United States of America. Her attacks on Islam won her support 
from conservatives but alienated her from less well-known Dutch 
Muslim women. 
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politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali. The Government developed a policy plan in 2005 and a 
broad range of measures from prevention to prosecution is being pursued, with yearly 
cabinet reports on progress. FGM is a penal offence subject to a maximum of four 
years’ imprisonment. However, there have been no prosecutions of perpetrators, 
one reason being that if the circumcision takes place in a country where it is not 
illegal – such as Somalia – then it is not currently punishable in Holland. Hirsi Ali 
suggested compulsory yearly medical checks on girls from high-risk groups with severe 
punishment for parents who refused to cooperate but this kind of drastic measure has 
been rejected in favour of prevention through education and awareness-raising.xcv
The situation in the Netherlands is common: regardless of whether there is a specific 
law on FGM or it falls under the general criminal code, prosecutions have been rare, 
suggesting that specific legislation has a largely symbolic purpose. The exception 
is France, which has prosecuted both parents and exiceuses (circumcisers) under 
the general penal code for the past two decades. France’s willingness to prosecute 
dates back to 1979, when an exiceuse of a three-year old girl was given a one-year 
suspended sentence. At the time, FGM was not considered a criminal offence. In 
1983, following the death a year earlier of a young girl who suffered a haemorrhage 
following circumcision, the Court of Final Appeal defined removal of the clitoris as 
a crime of violence under the penal code. The greatest media attention was given 
to two cases in 1991 involving the same exiceuse – Keita – and the parents of the 
children involved.xcvi There have been at least 36 lawsuits for excision since 1979, 
involving more than 80 young girls of whom four died, according to a study by the 
Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (CNCDH) in 2004.
Efforts to tackle FGM/C are even more hampered by a lack of data than policies on 
‘honour crimes’ and forced marriages. Marriages, violent crimes and murders are 
at least recorded. Short of following Hirsi Ali’s racially discriminatory suggestion, 
it is difficult to know how one would measure prevalence or the success of work 
to prevent new cases of FGM/C. Despite the fact that France has been penalising 
perpetrators for a quarter of a century, the French CNCDH 2004 study suggests 
that much work remains to be done.xcvii In the UK, the figure cited most often is 
FORWARD’s estimate that approximately 74,000 women in the UK have undergone 
the operation, with at least 7,000 girls at risk of it. Organisations in the UK claim 
that despite the new legislation, many practicing communities remain unaware that 
FGM is illegal.xcviii The obstacles to successful prosecution suggest that more than 
in other areas, the focus here should be on education and prevention rather than 
enforcement. Yet governments often opt for new laws as a relatively cheap and high-
profile way of showing commitment to tackling an issue: in 2000, in the UK, The All 
Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Population, Development and Reproductive 
Health made 47 recommendations for action on FGM, only two of which related to 
new legislation, yet the most visible outcome of the APPG’s work is the 2003 Female 
Genital Mutilation Act.xcix
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Dress
The ‘practices’ discussed above are better defined as abuses of women’s rights and 
forms of violence which few from either majority or minority communities attempt to 
defend. A different kind of ‘practice’ that has caused controversy in many European 
countries is wearing a hijab, niqab, burka and jiljab – forms of dress worn by some 
Muslim women. It is important to put this in a different category to ‘honour’ crimes, 
forced marriages and genital mutilations. There is no physical violence involved, in fact 
if there is an abuse of women’s rights it could be argued that the denial of the right 
to wear a headscarf is itself a human rights abuse and a denial of freedom or equal 
opportunity. In France, for example, the headscarf ban has resulted in the exclusion 
from schools of some girls, seriously harming their educational opportunities. Here the 
issues are gender equality, state neutrality and religious freedom. But while the topic 
is usually portrayed as a discrete one of religious freedom versus state neutrality and 
gender equality, the right of Muslim women and girls to wear a hijab etc is contested 
in different scenarios. Different questions arise depending on whether one is talking 
about schoolgirls, teachers and other public servants or state representatives, or 
employees in general. 
The subject has been debated with most heat in France, where a law now bans 
the wearing of ‘ostentatious religious symbols’ in schools. The controversy began 
in 1989 when three schoolgirls were excluded from a school in Creil (outside 
Paris) because of their refusal to remove their ‘scarves’ (the term originally used, 
later replaced by references to the veil and the hijab). In 1990 the Conseil d’Etat 
determined that the ‘scarf’ did not necessarily conflict with French laïcitéc and it was 
up to individual schools to determine dress codes (children in French state schools 
do not wear uniforms). In 1996 the issue arose again with the expulsion of girls 
wearing headscarves from a public school and the publication of guidance reinforcing 
the Conseil d’Etat opinion that the issue should be managed by teachers at a local 
level. However, in 2003, the report of the Stasi Commission on laïcité was published 
recommending a new law which was eventually passed in 2004.ci The Commission 
has been criticised in that no hijab-wearing women testified before it, compromising 
the degree to which the new law can be said to be based on full consultation. The 
main purpose of the law is to reaffirm the neutrality of education by forbidding all 
manifestations of religious or political allegiance in primary and secondary schools. A 
list of the discrete religious symbols that pupils may wear includes small crosses, Stars 
of David and Hands of Fatima. The main target is clearly the hijab and the perceived 
religious fundamentalist control of young girls and women, believed to be pressurised 
into wearing the hijab by parents, brothers and members of their community.cii Men 
wearing the Jewish Kippa or Sikh turban are also affected but have been described as 
‘collateral damage’ciii – these garments have never been controversial in the same way as 
the hijab. 
Opinion polls suggest a majority of the population support the new law, with a 
January 2004 survey for Agence France-Presse showing 78 per cent of teachers in 
favour. Muslim organisations on the whole took a non-confrontational approach, 
advising girls to wear fashionable bandanas to circumvent the law.civ But feminists and 
women’s NGOs in France have been deeply divided by the new law – and not simply 
22
Gender equality, cultural diversity: European comparisons and lessons 
along religious or ethnic lines. The respected feminist Christine Delphy has supported 
the ‘veiled women’ and challenged the assumption that the hijab can only be a symbol 
of female oppression and that young women wearing it are objects of manipulation. 
On the other hand, one of the most controversial organisations to emerge from the 
banlieuescv is Ni Putes Ni Soumises (‘neither whores nor submissive’) established by 
Fadela Amara in 2003. Amara was a witness before the Stasi Commission, where she 
argued that ‘there are unhappily more and more young women who wear the veil. 
I say unhappily because it is before anything else a tool for oppressing’cvi. And many, 
if not most, French women’s organisations supported the prohibition, including some 
representing women from an immigrant background.cvii 
While in the early days of the law, many schoolgirls defied the ban, a year after the 
act was passed, only a handful of girls remained excluded from public schools because 
of the law.cviii In September 2005, ‘Le Monde’ reported that only 12 students showed 
up with distinctive religious signs in the first week of classes, compared to 639 in the 
preceding year. It has, however, been reported that a number of students chose to study 
by distance learning and some have sought refuge at Belgian public schools.cix
In France, the hijab controversy reflects the significance attached to laïcité and 
citizenship and the role of education in transmitting both,cx explaining why the focus 
has been on public schools. In the UK, decisions on school dress codes are commonly 
left to each school’s governing body; and the absence of any strong secular discourse 
regarding the separation of church and state means there is no obvious parallel to the 
French debates on laïcité.cxi The one significant case arose when a Muslim schoolgirl 
pursued a legal case against her secondary school, on the grounds that it had 
unlawfully denied her freedom to manifest her religion when she was told she could 
not attend school wearing a jilbab.cxii The girl lost nearly two years’ schooling before 
being accepted at another school. In the last of three cases dealing with this and 
heard in 2006, the House of Lords concluded that there had been no interference with 
the claimant’s rights to manifest her beliefs in practice (because there was nothing to 
stop her going to an alternative school); and, in a minority judgment, that there had 
been interference with her right to manifest her beliefs, but that this interference was 
objectively justified. As in France, there was concern that the girl in question was not 
exercising free choice but was under pressure from family or the community, although 
this was denied.cxiii
In Germany, where religious freedom is guaranteed under the constitution, Muslim 
women’s dress has been debated in different contexts and in several legal cases. The 
case with most implications is that of Fereshta Ludin, who was rejected when she 
applied to be an elementary school teacher in Baden-Württemberg and refused to 
take off her headscarf. In 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court found that there was 
no legal basis for refusing to employ her because of her headscarf, but that German 
federal states should be entitled to decide what religious garments and symbols were 
appropriate for public servants.cxiv (In Germany, education is part of the remit of the 
federal states while the general rules governing civil servants’ behaviour is within the 
competence of the Union.) As a consequence of the Federal Constitutional Court 
ruling, seven federal states have now passed acts preventing teachers in public schools 
wearing headscarves, with some states – Berlin and Hessen – expanding the order 
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to other areas of the civil service such as policewomen and court officials. And the 
regulations in four states provide an exception for the ‘exhibition of Christian and 
Occidental educational and cultural values and traditions’ leading to charges that a 
double standard is being deployed.cxv One argument made by the Minister of cultural 
affairs in Baden-Württemberg was that nun’s attire should be exempted from the ban 
on religious attire because it is a form of ‘professional’ rather than ‘religious’ clothing.
cxvi 
The debate and law in France was a catalyst for similar debates across Europe. 
Following the introduction of the French law in 2004, senators of the Walloon socialist 
and liberal parties in Belgium proposed a ban on the headscarf in schools and public 
services, though this was not adopted.cxvii However, by the end of 2004, the majority of 
schools had reportedly prohibited headscarves.cxviii A parliamentary debate took place 
in Denmark in May 2004, when the Danish People’s Party proposed a prohibition on 
‘culturally specific’ headgear with an exemption for expressions of Christian-Jewish 
culture. 
It has been argued that visible manifestations of religion are particularly incompatible 
with the positions of teacher, judge and policewoman, where the office-holder is a 
representative of a religiously neutral state. In the Netherlands, the 2001 case of a law 
student who was not hired as court clerk because she refused to take off her scarf 
during court sessions caused disagreement, with the Commission of Equal Treatment 
supporting the right to wear a scarf, but the Minister of Justice and the National Board for 
Jurisdiction taking the view that religious symbols should not be allowed in the courtroom.
cxix
Pim Fortuyn and Dutch ‘New realism’
Former sociology professor, Pim Fortuyn formed his own party in 
2002 called Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn or LPF). He famously 
described Islam as a ‘backward culture’ and claimed Holland was 
a ‘full country’. Fortuyn was assassinated during the 2002 Dutch 
national election campaign by an animal rights activist. Since then, 
the Netherlands has been governed by conservative-neo-liberal 
parties and multiculturalism has been challenged by what has 
been defined as ‘the New Realism’.clxxiii This philosophy emphasises 
the need to listen to working class, autochthonous people who 
are in touch with reality; to ‘speak out’ and ‘face facts’ which the 
political establishment keep hidden; to affirm national identity 
and the values of Western civilization over those of Islam. And the 
‘New Realist’ discourse is highly gendered: while Western values 
are seen as challenging the traditional privileges and abuses of 
Muslim men, Muslim women are seen as a having an obvious 
interest in integration and conversion to Western values.
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In Austria, the right of schoolgirls and teachers to wear a hijab to school is recognised 
and it has been argued that schools should reflect social reality in all its pluralism, 
which includes Muslim women wearing the hijab. Despite this, Secretary of State for 
Domestic Affairs Liese Prokop is on record as stating that while respecting freedom of 
religious practice, she has a problem with public school teachers wearing headscarves 
and is in favour of a ban. However, there has been only one case in which a Linz 
school’s decision to ban all forms of head covering was overturned by the regional 
school inspectorate.cxx And the education ministry issued a statement in 2004 declaring 
that any restriction on wearing the headscarf would be contrary to constitutionally 
guaranteed freedom of religion.cxxi
Employment discrimination cases have been more straightforward. The European 
Union Employment Directive of 2000 prevents discrimination in employment on 
various grounds, including religion, and many countries have their own guarantees 
of religious freedom. In most employment disputes, the religious freedom of 
individual employees has been upheld, sometimes on the grounds of gender equality, 
demonstrating the intersection of gender and religious claims. In two cases in Norway, 
for example, an employer argued that wearing a hijab was incompatible with its 
uniform code but the Ombud reasoned that as many Muslim women wear the hijab 
for religious reasons, a seemingly gender-neutral uniform code could in fact constitute 
gender discrimination. Hijab bans have been ruled in violation of Norway’s Gender 
Equality Act.cxxii In Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, there has also been a 
tendency to rule against prohibition.cxxiii
A distinction is often made between wearing a hijab – seen as an acceptable 
manifestation of religious freedom – and wearing a niqab or burka – seen as inhibiting 
communication, in particular between teachers and pupils. In Sweden, all parties 
take the official view that headscarves should be allowed but two Somali girls in 
Gothenburg were not allowed to attend school wearing a burka.cxxiv Sweden’s National 
Agency for Education has stated that veils such as the burka may be banned in public 
schools ‘to ensure smooth interaction between teachers and students’. The Integration 
Minister added that in an open society it is essential ‘to see each other’s faces’.cxxv
In Germany, two school girls in the Bert-Brecht High school in Bonn were excluded for 
wearing a burka in 2006 on the grounds that it prohibits identification and face-to-
face communication. In Italy, the Northern League has campaigned against the burka 
and a woman was fined for wearing it under fascist-era legislation banning wearing 
masks in public.cxxvi In Norway in 2005, two secondary school girls arrived at school in 
Oslo wearing a niqab against the wishes of the school authorities. The Islamic Council 
in Norway, an umbrella body, demanded to be part of a dialogue to reach a solution 
but the conflict remains unresolved.cxxvii In 2003, when four students appeared at 
their Amsterdam school in a niqab, the Commission for Equal Treatment ruled that 
the school had not violated anti-discrimination law in disallowing this. The need for 
communication was judged to take precedence over religious freedom. And the ruling 
was used by other schools to adjust their regulations. In 2005, the conservative Dutch 
Member of Parliament Geeret Wilders proposed a ban on the niqab and burka in 
public spaces with the support of a parliamentary majority. Again, the reason given 
was communication but also terrorism and safety concerns and the fact that such 
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garments are an obstacle to women’s integration in Dutch society. The Dutch Cabinet 
was divided and the ban is unlikely to be implemented. In Belgium, a number of city 
councils have issued a ban (with an administrative fine) on wearing the burka in public 
on grounds of identification and security.
Wearing a niqab or burka has been made difficult in ways other than by 
straightforward prohibition. In 2006 Ahmed Atoutaleb, Amsterdam City Councillor 
for Social Affairs, announced that women who refused to remove their burka to 
enhance their employment options would be ineligible for social security benefits.cxxviii 
In Austria, a case was reported of a Muslim woman whose unemployment benefits 
were withdrawn because she had not accepted job offers that were conditional on 
removing her headscarf, although the decision was later reversed on appeal.cxxix
The UK is a notable exception to other European countries in that there was no ‘hijab 
issue’ to speak of or debate about prohibition before late 2006.cxxx However in the UK, 
as elsewhere, there are few positive images of hijab-wearing women, and to many 
people the burka and niqab symbolise the oppression of women in Islam. Norway’s 
Progressive Party proposed a ban on primary and secondary schoolchildren wearing 
headscarves on the grounds that one should not ‘tolerate that girls in such a young 
age are systematically indoctrinated to accept that women are subordinate and can be 
suppressed as adults’.cxxxi The quote exemplifies the belief that schoolgirls and perhaps 
also adult women who claim they wish to wear a hijab are being manipulated by elder 
brothers, fathers and others; that it is a symbol of women’s oppression and therefore 
cannot be freely chosen by women and girls.
Of the different contexts in which the hijab has been debated, it is the policy in 
schools that is most problematic. It is difficult to see prohibitions on the hijab in 
employment as anything other than indirect discrimination. The same applies to some 
extent to the right of public servants to wear what they choose. The effect of a strict 
interpretation of state neutrality could lead to a dearth of Muslim teachers, judges and 
policewomen which is not only undesirable but also conflicts with the objectives of 
those who see their mission as saving Muslim women from their oppressive culture. 
However, the case of schoolgirls and particularly those who claim the right to wear 
a niqab or burka, is more difficult. It involves minors who are not credited with the 
same ability to make free choices as adults. And wearing a burka does inhibit pupil-
teacher and pupil-pupil communication. But that does not mean that prohibition is 
the most effective tool, and taking the case of France, it is difficult to judge what has 
been achieved by the law of 2004. From outside the country, it is also very difficult to 
judge the level of support for the ban among French Muslim women and girls. Nor is 
it always clear what drives the anti-hijab discourse. It is clearly being used by different 
groups and with different agendas.
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Part 2: Discussion
This section identifies some of the recurring strategies, discourses 
and themes that emerge from the first part of the report and 
concludes with some observations on their policy implications. 
The role of gender
The challenges for policy makers are often articulated as conflicts between the rights 
of Europe’s new religious and cultural minorities to preserve their ‘traditional’ practices 
and the assumed democratic and egalitarian norms of majority European societies. 
But if there is a conflict, it is not a gender-neutral one. What is often ignored is how 
many of these areas of tension concern women’s rights. Family reunification, forced/
arranged marriages, FGM/C and the hijab have all been debated in terms of protecting 
women from oppressive patriarchal traditions. Women’s dominant role in raising 
the next generation of European citizens is another way in which they are identified 
as having a critical role in integration and the relationship of minority and majority 
societies.cxxxii Women have been described as the main vehicles of integration but also 
the first victims of the failure of integration.cxxxiii
Also relevant is the perception many European countries have of themselves as 
standard-bearers on gender equality. The Nordic countries are often perceived as a 
model of gender politics in terms of political participation, childcare, benefits and an 
emphasis on a dual breadwinner system. Sweden, in particular, has been described as 
‘constructing gender equality as a frame for Swedish political identity … Not only the 
presence and visibility of feminists in government and in policymaking bureaucracies, 
but also the conscious portrayal of gender equality as the Swedish model, an export 
for other countries to emulate’.cxxxiv This can translate into the unfounded assumption 
that white European women have achieved equality and the task is now to bring 
women from minorities up to their level. ‘Practices’ such as ‘honour’ related violence 
then come to exemplify the difference between Muslim/immigrant and European 
values. For example, in 2003 the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs (responsible for 
emancipation policy) declared that women’s emancipation in the Netherlands 
was complete apart from that of immigrant women. This led to the creation of 
a commission, PaVEM, in 2003 to promote the labour participation of immigrant 
women. Yet the Netherlands has by no means achieved equality for native Dutch 
women: despite an emancipation policy that focuses on women’s labour participation, 
after a quarter of a century, only 40 per cent of Dutch women are economically 
active.cxxxv Similarly, in a policy statement for 2004-2009, the Flemish Minister for 
Equal Opportunities prioritised the emancipation of allochtonous (particularly 
Muslim) women, implying that the majority of autochthonous women have achieved 
emancipation.cxxxvi
This is an unhelpful approach: it sets up a ‘them and us’ dichotomy that is alienating to 
men and women alike in minority and Muslim communities. It ignores the key role of 
women in NGOs in drawing attention to issues such as FGM/C in the first place, often 
in the face of disinterest from policy makers. And it also ignores the levels of gender 
inequality and violence against women that persist in every European country: studies 
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have shown that 40 per cent of German woman have suffered sexual or physical 
violence, and two women each week in Britain are killed by a current or former 
partner.cxxxvii There seems to be a common and misleading assumption that violence 
against women is endemic only in minority communities. The Dutch emancipation 
policy document states that 60 per cent of those taking refuge in women’s shelters 
are of immigrant origin.cxxxviii In Germany, a widely-quoted survey in 2004 found that 
refugee women and female migrants from Turkey and Eastern Europe experienced 
higher-than-average rates of violence.cxxxix Without context, this kind of reporting can 
lead to a stigmatising of minority cultures that ignores the different contexts in which 
gender violence takes place, and the prevalence of violence against women in all 
communities. (It is worth noting, for example, that the number of German women 
reported to have suffered from family violence is only marginally lower than that of 
migrants from Turkey and Eastern Europe.) cxl It is likely, however, that women from 
minority groups have less support from within and outside their communities, and less 
access to appropriate resources than majority women when they are threatened with 
violence.
This is why the work of minority women’s NGOs is crucial. Their role has been 
significant in providing support to victims and drawing attention to the problems 
discussed here, but has often been unrecognised and under-resourced. It is usually 
a shocking case highlighted by the media that is the catalyst for legislative reform 
or policy changes. In the UK, concerns about forced marriage, FGM and ‘honour’ 
Naïma Amzil and the headscarf in Belgium
In 2005, the director of a West-Flemish company received 
anonymous death threats demanding the resignation of his 
headscarf-wearing employee Naïma Amzil. The case captured 
the media, political and public attention, and held a mirror up to 
the Belgian population, showing where extreme intolerance, and 
religious and cultural stigmatisation could lead. Because of her 
composed reaction, and (in particular) her West-Flemish accent, 
Naïma gained much sympathy among the Belgian public. The case 
contributed to a certain shift in the debate on the emancipation 
of Muslim women by bringing the problem of racist and gender-
specific ethnic discrimination in the workplace into the public eye. 
Until recently little attention was given to the low labour market 
participation of migrant women. A common misconception is 
that so-called allochthonous girls by virtue of their higher school 
achievements experience relatively less discrimination in the 
labour market compared to allochthonous boys. The impact 
of negative images of immigrant and Muslim women is often 
ignored, as well as the ethno-stratification of the labour market 
and the underachievement of highly educated immigrant women 
(especially in Brussels).
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based violence have been raised for many years by black and minority ethnic women’s 
organisations, but it has taken newspaper or television reports of a horrific killing to 
provoke a response from the authorities. 
Most contributors to the Amsterdam conference reported too little consultation with 
the women who are the intended beneficiaries of these initiatives. Muslims and people 
from ethnic minorities are inadequately represented at governmental or parliamentary 
level in all the countries discussed here; and women from these groups are even more 
underrepresented. It is often the case that ethnic minority concerns are represented 
by men, feminism and gender concerns by white women, while women from minority 
communities are required to choose between their gender and their ethnic/religious 
identities, with few channels to empower them to speak for themselves and articulate 
a multi-dimensional or hyphenated identity.cxli In the UK, where some black, Asian and 
Muslim women’s groups have now established themselves as ‘stakeholders’, they are 
only consulted by Government on ‘minority women’s issues’ – ‘honour’ violence, FGM 
and forced marriage – and rarely on broader gender and immigration issues such as 
racial violence or equal pay. Without more direct involvement in policy, interpretations 
of religious and cultural norms remain in the hands of patriarchal community leaders 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of women in those communities.
On a positive note, some of the stigmatising or sensationalist focus on violence has 
helped inspire new grass-roots activism and networking by minority ethnic and 
religious women. When the Belgian Minister of Internal Affairs, Patrick Dewael, 
published an essay titled ‘Forced veiling is unacceptable’ in which he linked the hijab to 
forced marriage and female genital mutilation, 32 allochtonous women’s organisations 
signed an open letter to the Minister. This was followed by the creation of the 
Action Committee of Muslim Women in Flanders and a platform called ‘Keep off my 
headscarf’.cxlii
Religion and culture
The targeted practices discussed here are identified with minority religious and cultural 
communities, but there is little consistency or clarity as to whether it is religion or 
culture that is problematic. While all of the countries discussed are predominantly 
Christian in ethos and history, the official role of religion and its position in relation 
to the state varies, and this helps determine official and media perspectives on 
minority ‘traditions’. France is unique in its determination to defend laïcité, reflected 
in its confrontational position in legally prohibiting religious manifestations in schools. 
In other countries, as in Britain, it has been stressed that forced marriage, FGM 
and ‘honour’ killings are traditional or cultural practices that are not condoned in 
any religion, suggesting an unwillingness to condemn religion per se and a more 
ambiguous relationship between religion and politics.cxliii A report to the Council of 
Europe on ‘so-called “honour crimes”’ defines them as ‘an ancient practice sanctioned 
by culture rather than religion…’.cxliv
The danger here is that ‘culture’ is given agency. It is ‘culture’, tradition or ancient ritual 
that kills and abuses women, not individual perpetrators. Television reports of Fadime 
Sahindal’s murder in Sweden included the following report: 
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‘So finally it was Fadime’s father who held the gun although many more can be said 
to have been there with him last night; relatives, neighbours and thousand year old 
patriarchal traditions.’cxlv
In some countries, religious freedom is guaranteed alongside state neutrality. In 
Germany, for example, there is a constitutional (Article Four) guarantee of religious 
freedom. The Danish constitution guarantees freedom of religion but the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church is the only religious organisation funded by the state. In these 
countries – as in Britain – the effect is an implicit privileging of the traditional 
Christian religion that makes it difficult to deny minority religious organisations the 
same privileges. In the Netherlands and Belgium, there is a history of ‘pillarisation’, 
with society traditionally divided into groups along confessional, philosophical/non-
confessional and ideological lines (eg trade unions) and each ‘pillar’ having its own 
state-funded schools, hospitals, nursing homes etc. This has led to some debate about 
whether there should be an Islamic ‘pillar’.cxlvi 
In countries where religion is seen – increasingly – as a basis of rights alongside gender, 
disability and race, rather than something to be kept distinct from public policy, religious 
organisations may be able to claim exemption from anti-discrimination laws, but there is 
no such legal protection for ‘culture’ in European countries. In Norway, for example, all 
registered faith communities receive state support and Norwegian equality law contains 
wide exemptions for faith groups.cxlvii In the UK, a new Commission for Equality and Human 
Rights will be created in 2007 providing statutory protection against religious discrimination 
for the first time; and religious organisations have won exemptions in some areas of anti-
discrimination legislation.cxlviii In Belgium, both gender equality and religious freedom are 
upheld in the constitution but religion is able to claim exemption from gender equality 
law.cxlix The European Women’s Lobby (EWL) has published a paper on ‘Religion and 
Women’s Human Rights’ in response to ‘concerns expressed by EWL members about a 
perceived stronger influence on governments of religious argumentation with respect 
to women’s role and gender equality’.cl 
However targeting religion as the cause of gender inequality is also problematic. In 
France, there is no evidence that the prohibition of the hijab has been useful to girls in 
need of protection – opinion is divided on this. There is even less evidence that it has 
contributed to national cohesion and more to suggest that it has added to the Muslim 
communities’ perception that they are being specifically targeted. Focusing on Islam 
is also misleading. In the case of Fadime Sahindal, for example, there was no Muslim 
connection – her family was Catholic.cli Policies that stigmatise either religion or culture 
are never going to reflect the reality of Europe’s new (and not so new) identities. 
Targeting Muslim populations – whether as religious or cultural communities 
– also means that the experiences and needs of Europe’s other minorities are not 
acknowledged. There are concerns relating to integration and social exclusion for 
non-Muslim minorities, and women from non-Muslim minority groups have specific 
experiences of violence. The needs of minorities identified as ‘racial’ rather than 
‘cultural’ or ‘religious’ may now be ignored.clii Equally, the focus on culture and religion 
means that other factors are ignored. Muslim communities in Britain have higher rates 
of unemployment, lower rates of education and worse housing than any other group 
in society. Focusing on ‘their’ culture or religion as the problem means that social and 
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economic factors, including institutional discrimination, are overlooked and individuals 
and communities are blamed for their own marginalisation.
The extrapolation from a few shocking media cases to a wider group also means that an 
entire community, culture or religion is condemned for the crime of an individual. There 
is little recognition of the many Muslims living in Germany (and elsewhere) who find the 
use of the term ‘honour’ to legitimate forced marriage and murder as disconcerting as 
most Germans.cliii And a number of contributors to the project expressed concern that 
gender equality has been employed opportunistically, often by those on the right with 
little previous interest in gender equality, to stigmatise minorities or suggest that an 
Islamic identity is incompatible with democratic values.cliv
The blurring of different kinds of crimes and/or practices also contributes to the 
portrayal of certain crimes as endemic to minority communities. Forced marriage 
and sometimes FGM are now included under work to address ‘honour crimes’ in the 
UK. Discussing the hijab in an interview, the Austrian Secretary of State for Domestic 
Affairs went on to say, ‘We also have to fight against excesses such as forced 
marriages or so-called ‘honour crimes’ within the Muslim community’ and ‘we have 
to teach Muslim women who get themselves beaten that this is different with us’.clv In 
2005, the Austrian Secretary of State for Health and Women, Maria Rauch-Kallat, in 
conjunction with the six other woman federal ministers, launched an initiative against 
‘harmful traditional practices’ or ‘HTP’clvi covering FGM, forced marriage and ‘honour’ 
crimes. During Austria’s presidency of the European Union in 2006, the initiative was 
taken to European level and became NAHT: the Network Against Harmful Traditions’. 
There is a danger that violence against women is identified as a particular problem 
of minority communities and that all forms of minority-specific violence are then 
subsumed under the heading of ‘honour-based violence’ or ‘traditional harmful 
practices’ and segregated from mainstream work on violence against women. While 
the UK has a working group on Violence Against Women which includes forced 
marriage, FGM and ‘honour’ violence within its working definition, it is more common 
to find these treated as discrete areas of work. This can reinforce the assumption that 
violence against women is a problem only in minority communities. It also means 
missed opportunities for sharing good practice, working in partnership and joint 
initiatives. 
Legislative and policy implicationsclvii
Those with experience of the problems discussed here consistently argue that the 
main need is resources, firstly for service provision, and secondly for educational and 
campaign work. A universal problem is the lack of research and corresponding lack 
of evidence on the extent of the problems discussed here.clviii National figures on the 
prevalence of FGM/C or forced marriage, for example, are either unavailable or based 
on a compilation of estimates from NGOs. The same figure originally provided by 
FORWARD has been quoted in the UK for several years now. This means that there is 
no way of judging the effectiveness of the initiatives identified here, some of which 
began several years ago. It also means that it is difficult to challenge sensationalist 
journalism implying disproportionate and growing levels of violence in minority 
communities. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Beliefs, Asma 
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Jahangir, has said ‘Figures available on HRV [Honour-Related Violence] are grossly 
underestimated and governments should set up mechanisms to collect reliable 
statistics and information about such crimes’.clix 
The stated objective of all initiatives on FGM, forced marriage and ‘honour’ violence is 
to improve women’s rights and protect girls and women from minority communities. 
However, a common denominator – particular in relation to marriage – is the use of 
immigration regulations. Increasing the age at which citizens can be joined by a spouse 
from overseas may protect women from forced marriage – though this has not been 
demonstrated – but it will also reduce the number or family reunification entrants. This 
threatens the credibility of work by statutory bodies, leading to a perception by minority 
communities that reducing immigration is the main objective or at least a welcome by-
product of this work.clx The location of the UK’s forced marriage work in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office was problematic in focussing on the ‘overseas dimension’ while 
failing to record cases of forced marriage between two UK citizens. 
The effectiveness of immigration regulation in protecting women has also been 
challenged with the suggestion that measures could backfire and result in girls being 
taken out of education early and sent abroad to marry if their families are unable to 
sponsor a spouse to join them in Europe. In the case of Denmark, Anja Bredal has 
referred to ‘a tightening of borders in the name of women’s rights’ and suggests ‘[a] 
sharper distinction must be made between those legal and social policy measures 
that are taken to strengthen individuals’ right to self-determination and facilitate the 
empowerment of individuals, and those that are designed to regulate or police group 
behaviour’.clxi Her argument could be applied beyond Denmark. 
In addressing violence against women in minority communities, all countries have 
recognised the need to combine punishment with prevention. The difficulty is in finding 
the most effective balance between enforcement (to protect existing victims and 
penalise perpetrators) and awareness-raising (to reduce future prevalence). Countries 
discussed here have struck this balance at different points. Where new legislation has 
been passed targeting minority practices, it was often not legally necessary and is 
validated for its symbolic status in sending a message to the communities in question 
that certain practices are illegal and unacceptable.clxii New laws often do no more than 
emphasise an already existent, general, legal state of affairs.clxiii The UK’s Forced Marriage 
Consultation acknowledged that legislation is already in place that enables prosecution, 
suggesting that the main object of legislation against forced marriage is to highlight its 
(existing) illegality.clxiv Similarly, in Norway spouses now have to sign a document agreeing 
that both partners have an equal right to divorce – something they have long had with 
or without such a document.clxv 
There is little evidence that targeted legislation is effective. The country with the 
strongest track record on prosecuting parents and exiceuses – France – has no specific 
law but prosecutes under the general penal code. Britain, a country with not one 
but two specific laws on FGM has so far had no prosecutions under the legislation. 
Norway’s 1998 law prohibiting FGM was supplemented by an Action Plan for 2001-
2003, partly in recognition that without education and training for service providers, 
the law had not been effective.clxvi There is a risk that legislation substitutes for more 
costly interventions, and also a danger that the use of ‘culture-specific’ rather than 
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generic legislation can contribute to public representations of minority cultural and 
religious groups as more patriarchal, ‘traditional’, and backward than the majority 
groups. Against that, women’s NGO’s have sometimes supported targeted legislation 
but stressed that this must be accompanied by adequately funded awareness-raising 
and educational work.clxvii
The question of whether to use general laws or create specific ones relates to the 
overall approach to violence against women from minority communities that takes a 
particular form. Should policy work and services be established separately or as part of 
general work on violence and women’s or children’s rights? In the UK this point arises 
when ‘honour’ crimes are identified as a distinct category for purposes of policing. 
There has been consensus among women’s groups – particularly those representing 
minority women – that more needs to be done to address ‘honour’ crimes, but 
also concern that this should not be detached from the wider category of domestic 
violence. In Belgium, there is some reluctance to use categories such as ‘honour-
related’. Rather than ‘culturalise’ women’s experiences, organisations such as SAMV (a 
support point for allochtonous girls and women) emphasize the ‘interculturalisation’ 
of services, meaning greater inclusiveness and sensitivity to the needs of women from 
minority groups.clxviii 
In other countries ‘packages’ of initiatives have targeted violence against minority 
women in isolation from other gender protection work – for example the Network 
Against Harmful Traditions spearheaded by Austria. The Norwegian Government 
established a Working Group on Violence Against Women in December 2003 but the 
Group sees forced marriage and FGM as outside its remit because they have been 
covered in separate action plans. This has been described as a ‘significant missed 
opportunity for mainstreaming’.clxix
‘The Alien Bride’ 
In Germany, a book by Necla Kelek ‘Die Fremde Braut’ or ‘The 
Alien Bride’ was significant in drawing attention to the problem 
of young girls imported from Turkey to be married to Germans 
of Turkish origin. While the book has been praised for drawing 
attention to a previously unrecognised problem, Kelek has also 
been subject to criticism. In 2006, ‘Die Zeit’ published an open 
letter from 60 migration researchers criticising the simplistic 
and clichéd portrayal of Turkish/Muslim culture in the personal 
testimonies of writers such as Kelek.
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It is worth asking why these same issues became topical in so many countries at the 
same time. As women’s NGOs point out, these are not new problems. Partly this 
demonstrates the domino effect that can happen in Europe. The French controversy 
about the hijab and new law triggered debates across Europe but particularly in its 
neighbouring countries. In central Europe, events in one country clearly influence 
public and media opinion in neighbouring states, perhaps less so in relation to the 
UK than other countries discussed here, where the hijab has been less of an issue. 
On some issues, there have been attempts to coordinate action at European level 
or between several European countries (in relation to forced marriage and ‘honour’ 
crimes, but not FGM/C). It is also useful to ask whose agendas are served by the new 
focus on violence against minority women. In some cases there are legitimate concerns 
that women’s rights are being exploited by an anti-immigration or Islamophobic 
agenda. This puts minority women’s organisations in a difficult position in combining 
criticism of restrictive immigration policies with support for the commitment to protect 
women from violence. 
In looking at the way different countries have addressed the problem of violence 
against women from minority groups, the most important question is whether 
these policies have been successful in reducing the incidence of phenomena such as 
FGM/C, forced marriage and ‘honour’ related violence. On the evidence here, there 
is no clear-cut answer. On the one hand, measures that specifically target certain 
groups or identify certain crimes as based on ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’ do not appear to 
have succeeded. Laws on FGM have rarely been enforced. And the aim of securing 
women’s rights and safety has been compromised by perceptions that the underlying 
motive is reducing immigration. But it is not possible to map the success of the various 
initiatives described because a common problem is the lack of research and data on 
the extent of these ‘problems’. Public and political concern is generally raised by a 
few high-profile cases rather than by solid evidence provided by NGOs and service 
providers. While the punitive initiatives tend to receive more attention, there is clearly 
useful work being done to raise awareness in the communities concerned, but this is 
under-resourced and unmeasured. 
In conclusion, three points have emerged from this project on which there is a 
consensus among participants:
1  The importance of balancing policies and laws that target minority communities with 
mainstreaming work on FGM/C, forced marriage and ‘honour’ violence within work 
on violence against women using a human rights framework. 
2  The need to empower women within the communities concerned and facilitate 
their agency in working towards improved protection. With the exception of a few 
celebrated individuals and victims, minority, migrant and Muslim women remain the 
subject of debate rather than leading it. 
3  The need for better resources to enable women’s NGOs to carry out research and 
fund education and service provision to support victims and prevent future abuses. 
Conclusion
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Project outline and participants
The project on Gender Equality, Cultural Diversity: European comparisons and lessons 
was led by Anne Phillips of the Gender Institute, London School of Economics, and 
Sawitri Saharso of the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. It was funded by the Nuffield 
Foundation. It proceeded through two conferences to explore the normative and 
policy issues posed by the relationship between gender equality and cultural diversity, 
and develop a comparative analysis of the way these were being addressed in different 
countries in Europe. The first conference was held at the London School of Economics 
in May 2005; the second at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, June 2006. Contributors 
presented papers outlining the issues as they have arisen and been debated in their 
own country. 
Conference Participants (Amsterdam, June 2006):
Haleh Afshar University of York, UK 
Sabine Berghahn Freie Univerität Berlin 
Anja Bredal Institute for Social Research, Norway 
Gily Coene University of Warwick, UK 
Moira Dustin London School of Economics, UK 
Martin Frank Universität Bremen, Germany 
Aisha Gill University of Roehampton, UK 
Halleh Ghorashi Vrije Universiteit, Netherlands 
Zenia Hellgren Stockholms Universitet, Sweden 
Barbara Hobson Stockholms Universitet, Sweden 
Elizabeth Holzleithner Universität Wien, Austria 
Riva Kastoryano CERI, France 
Chia Longman Universiteit Gent, Belgium 
Anne Phillips London School of Economics, UK 
Baukje Prins Rijksuniversiteit, Netherlands 
Petra Rostock Freie Univerität Berlin 
Sawitri Saharso Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam 
Birte Siim Aalborg Universitet, Denmark 
Hege Skjeie Universitetet i Oslo, Norway 
Julia Szalai ELTE University, Hungary 
Martine Spensky Université Blaise Pascal, France 
Sabine Strasser Universität Wien, Austria
The initial list of contributors included participants from Spain, Italy, and the Czech 
Republic, but for a variety of reasons, not all contributors were able to participate 
fully in the two conference. The report, as a result, draws primarily on the following 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, and the UK. Though we benefited from the full participation of our 
contributor from Hungary – Julia Szalai – the Hungarian experience has not been 
systematically included in this report because it raises rather different kinds of issues. 
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Population figures
Most of these figures are estimates and will not have been collated in the same 
way. The percentage of the population that are non-nationals is likely to be an 
underestimation in most cases. Some countries do not record the religion of citizens 
(France is notable in not recording ethnicity), and even where religious populations are 
assessed, no distinction is made between practicing and non-practicing Muslims. 
The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights report 2005 (see references) 
gives details of Europe’s Muslim populations and also evidence of racially and 
religiously motivated hate crimes against Muslims and the universally higher rates of 
unemployment and social exclusion they experience. 
•  Austria’s population is 8.2 million. There is a foreign population of 8.9 per cent of 
whom half are from Eastern Europe and 18 per cent are from Turkey. 9 per cent of 
the population are non-nationals.
•  Belgium’s population is 10.3 million. 9 per cent of the population are non-nationals, 
with significant numbers of Moroccan, Turkish and Albanian origin.
•  Denmark’s population is 5.4 million of whom five per cent are estimated (there are 
no official figures) to have a Muslim background and/or are originally from Turkey, 
Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Many are refugees or former refugees 
and the majority live in cities. five per cent of the population are non-nationals. 
•  France’s population is 62 million and its non-national population is 6 per cent. 
Although there are no official statistics, France is estimated to have the largest 
Muslim population in Western Europe, the majority from the former North African 
colonies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, but also from sub-Saharan Africa and 
Turkey. About half of all Muslims in France are French-born or naturalised. 
•  Germany’s population is 83 million and it has a non-national population of 9 per 
cent, many from Turkey, and more recently from Bosnia and Kosovo. Until recently, 
immigrants were considered ‘guest workers’ who would eventually leave. 
•  Italy’s population is 58 million. 2.5 per cent of the population is non-nationals. 
•  The Netherlands’ total population is 16 million with 4 per cent non-nationals. Many 
immigrants in the 1950s came from the former colonies of Suriname and Indonesia, 
later groups of Muslims came from Somalia, Turkey and Morocco, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. 
•  Norway’s total population is just under 5 million. Oslo has the largest proportion of 
immigrants at 23 per cent. The immigrant population overall is 8 per cent. Half of all 
first-generation immigrants arrived in Norway as refugees. 
•  Sweden’s population is 9 million. 5 per cent of the population are non-nationals. 
•  The UK population is 59 million of whom the Muslim population is 2.8 per cent (as 
established for the first time by the 2001 Census). Eight per cent of the population 
are from non-white ethnic groups. Most British Muslims have their origin in the 
Indian subcontinent. The majority were born in the UK and have citizenship. Four per 
cent of the UK’s population are non-nationals. 
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[Sources: European Migration Centre at www.emz-berlin.de/start/noAnimation.htm, 
Institute for National Statistics in France, US State Department, International Helsinki 
Federation for Human Rights, www.statistics.gov.uk, BBC.co.uk, Statistics Norway at 
www.ssb.no/english/, Amsterdam conference papers]
Appendix 3
Contacts
These are just a few of the NGOs working 
on these issues in the countries discussed. 
E-quality (Netherlands) www.e-quality.nl 
FORWARD (UK/International)  
www.forwarduk.org.uk
GAMS (France)  
http://perso.orange.fr/ 
..associationgams/index.html
Imakaan (UK)  
www.imkaan.org.uk
Inssan (Germany)  
www.inssan-ev.de
Kurdish Women Action Against  
Honour Killing (KWAHK) (UK)  
www.kwahk.org
Kvinnoforum (Sweden)  
www.kvinnoforum.se 
LOKK (Denmark)  
www.lokk.dk
Newham Asian Women’s Project (UK)  
www.nawp.org
Ni Putes Ni Soumises (France)  
www.niputesnisoumises.com
Orient Express (Austria)  
www.orientexpress-wien.com
Papatya (Austria)  
www.papatya.org
Peregrina (Austria)  
www.peregrina.at
SAMV/The Centre for Allochtonous  
Girls and Women (Belgium)  
www.samv.be
Southall Black Sisters (UK)  
www.southallblacksisters.org.uk
Terrafem (Sweden)  
www.terrafem.org 
Terre des Femmes (Germany)  
www.terre-des-femmes.de 
TransAct (Netherlands)  
www.transact.nl 
Women Living Under  
Muslim Laws (international) 
www.wluml.org 
Women’s National Commission (UK)  
www.thewnc.org.uk
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i  Participating countries included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy (2005 only), Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK. Norway is the only 
country that is not a member of the European Union. 
ii  Siim, 2006. Siim is referring to Denmark but the point has wider relevance.
iii  For example, the Kvinnoforum 2005 resource book on Honour-based violence, which 
reports from seven countries (see references).
iv  Professor Sawitri Saharso, opening the Conference on ‘Gender equality, cultural 
diversity: European comparisons and lessons’ held in Amsterdam on 8th June 2006.
v  For example, in Norway, laws to protect minority women have been promoted by the 
right wing Progressive Party, which at the same time rejects anti-discrimination laws 
as unnecessary (Skjeie, 2006).
vi  For example, the VEIL project: Values, Equality and Differences in Liberal Democracies. 
Debates about Female Muslim Headscarves in Europe. The project will compare 
policies on Muslim headscarves in a number of European countries. (www.univie.
ac.at/veil/Home3)  
vii  The status of second and third wives in European countries that do not recognise 
polygamy is often unclear. For example, in 2003, it was estimated that there are 
8,000 polygamous families in France with an average of 12 people in each. Following 
a ban on polygamous family reunification in 1993, husbands often bring their wives 
into the country as ‘sisters’ or ‘cousins’ (Le Figaro, 3rd July 2003).
viii  ‘Repudiation’ – where a man divorces his wife simply by saying ‘I divorce you’ 
– is illegal in France but has been accepted in the past on the basis of bilateral 
agreements such as that between France and Morocco in 1981, leaving the Muslim 
women involved caught between two systems of law and lacking legal protection or 
entitlement to state benefits (see ‘Le Figaro’ 3rd July 2003 and www.femmes-egalite.
gouv.fr/espace_presse/dossiers_2005/050307_synthese.htm). In the UK, women 
who have a nikah (Muslim marriage ceremony) without also marrying according to 
English civil law, may find themselves with few legal rights if the marriage breaks 
down (See Shah-Kazemi, Sonia Nûrîn (2001) ‘Untying the Knot. Muslim Women, 
Divorce and the Shariah’ Nuffield Foundation). See also Sami Aldeeb et Andrea 
Bonomi eds (1999) ‘Le droit musulman de la famille et des successions à l’épreuve 
des ordres juridiques occidentaux’, Publications de l’Institut suisse de droit comparé, 
Schulthess, Zürich.
ix  For example, Flemish policy allows ‘allochthonous’ women more visibility in policy in 
while the French-speaking part of the country there is a greater sense that focussing 
on ethnicity can artificially reinforce splits between groups in the population (Coene 
and Longman, 2006). Aiming to provide a counterpoint to the conservative/right 
wing government (and parliamentary majority), the governing Viennese Social 
Democratic Party uses and implements the slogan ‘Vienna is different’ in its migration 
policies. (Holzleithner and Strasser, 2006).
x  Certainly a concern in Britain was that the 7 July 2005 terrorists were UK-born and 
raised.
xi  For example, in France, 79% of immigration is through family reunion (Spensky, 
2006). 
xii  Or, in Norway, what is described as ‘strict entry – generous stay’ (Skjeie, 2006), 
meaning it is difficult to enter the country but conditions are generous in terms 
of welfare for those who manage it. In Austria, the slogan ‘Integration over 
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immigration’ has been in use since the early 1990s (Holzleither and Strasser, 2006).
xiii  For example, in the UK, the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act was passed in 
2006, following The Asylum and Immigration Treatment of Claimants, etc. Act 2004, 
the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, and the Immigration and Asylum 
Act 1999. In Austria, a new asylum law came into force in 2004 and the Justice 
Minister’s proposal in July 2005 for an extended waiting period for naturalisation 
was followed by the Alien Law codification that came into force in January 2006. 
Germany saw a new Immigration Act in 2004. France tightened its laws in 2003 and 
2006. Denmark’s Aliens Act of 1998 was amended in 2002. 
xiv  See Berghahn and Rostock, 2006. Britain has been described as being in a state 
of ‘multicultural drift’ (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain/The 
Runnymede Trust, 2000, p14).
xv  In Austria, for example, Secretary of State Liese Prokop announced that 45% of 
Austria’s Muslim population are ‘not willing to integrate’ (Holzleithner and Strasser, 
2006). In the Netherlands, a commission was set up by Parliament to investigate the 
perceived failure of Dutch integration policies after thirty years (Prins and Saharso, 
2006).
xvi  See Berghahn and Rostock, 2006 and Holzleithner and Strasser, 2006.
xvii  See Community Cohesion Panel (2004) ‘The End of Parallel Lives? The Report of the 
Community Cohesion Panel’ July 2004.
xviii  Under the UK Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, applicants for 
citizenship must pass an English language test and make an oath of allegiance in a 
citizenship ceremony. Community cohesion has been an area of policy work since 
the unrest in Northern towns of summer 2001 and a new Commission for Equality 
and Human Rights to be established in 2007 will have a responsibility to promote 
‘good relations’ between groups and individuals, prioritising race and religion. In 
2006 a Commission on Integration and Cohesion was launched to study community 
tensions and address concerns about segregation. Germany’s 2004 Immigration 
Act includes a compulsory integration course. Austria’s 2002 Integration Agreement 
obliges immigrants to attend German language and integration courses and an 
amendment to the Citizen Act introduced new conditions for granting citizenship 
status, including proof of language ability and basic knowledge of the democratic 
order and Austrian history. In France, prior to 1993, all children born in France had 
French nationality unless they or their parents chose otherwise. The ‘Pasqua laws’ 
obliged children born to foreign parents, to ‘manifest their will’ in order to become 
French. The Contrat d’Accueil introduced in 2003 must be signed by all those 
admitted to live in France and reminds applicants that France is a secular country and 
that equality between men and women is one of its fundamental principles. It also 
commits them to learning the French language. The criteria for Danish citizenship 
includes certified knowledge of the language. The Danish immigration package 
of 2002 contained two key components: the age limit of 24 for family reunion 
and an ‘introductory grant’ for refugees in place of social assistance – criticised for 
undermining universal equal treatment and increasing poverty. The Flemish-Belgian 
inburgering decree of 2003 introduced an obligation to go through a process of 
integration, including language classes. In the Netherlands, the Wet Inburgering 
Nieuwkomers law of 1998 established free but compulsory integration courses for 
newcomers. As of March 2006, migrants settling in the Netherlands are required to 
take a civic integration exam before entering the country at a cost of 350 Euros (EU 
citizens, American and Japanese nationals are exempt). Norway’s 2004 Introduction 
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Act combines an obligatory introduction programme, including both language and 
education about Norwegian society, with financial support. Those who do not 
attend the programme have their support reduced. See participants’ conference 
papers for further details of these policies. 
xix  Hellgren and Hobson, 2006.
xx  Siim, 2006.
xxi  Speech by Ruth Kelly, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government at 
launch of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 24thAugust 2006. Available 
at www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1502280 [accessed 02/09/06].
xxii  Siim, 2006; Prins and Saharso, 2006.
xxiii  For example, The UN Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for 
Marriage and Registration of Marriage, 1962 affirms that all states should ensure 
complete freedom in the choice of a spouse and has been signed by Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Italy, and adopted by Austria, Germany, Norway, 
Spain and the UK. According to the Family Reunification directive approved by the 
European Union Council of Ministers in 2003, Third Country National’s with one-
year residence permits are entitled to be reunited with their family, including spouses 
and children. See also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, the United 
Nationals International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, UN Convention 
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 1979, 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, The UN Convention 
on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriage 
1962, The Council of Europe Resolution 1327 2003 on ‘So-called “honour crimes”’ 
on 4 April 2003, the European Union Race Directive 2000/43 and Employment 
Directive 2000/78, and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 59/165 
‘Working towards the elimination of crimes against women and girls committed in 
the name of honour’ 2004/2005.
xxiv  See Kvinnoforum, 2005 and Rude-Antoine, 2005.
xxv  For example, in two cases the ECHR has upheld member states’ rights to legitimately 
limit religious manifestation in the form of wearing a headscarf. In Dahlab versus 
Switzerland 2001 and in Sahin versus Turkey 2004/1005. 
xxvi  www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Pa
ge&cid=1094234857863 [accessed 12/08/06].
xxvii  Rude-Antoine, 2005, p7.
xxviii  Gangoli, Razak and McCarry, 2006, pages 12 and 15.
xxix  The Group’s report was published in 2000: ‘A Choice by Right. The Report of 
the Working Group on Forced Marriage’. London, Home Office Communications 
Directorate, 2000.
xxx  The Unit’s caseload is now approximately 300 cases per year. The work involves 
co-operation with local offices of the British High Commission and police forces in 
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh; as well as liaison with women’s refuges in the UK in 
order to find alternative accommodation for those who can no longer return to the 
family home. The Unit has been proactive both in its ‘rescue missions’ for individuals 
threatened with an unwanted marriage (by 2004, it had assisted in the repatriation 
of more than one hundred young people) and in the guidelines it has helped prepare 
for police officers, social workers, and teachers. These all stress the importance of 
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talking to the young people on their own, away from the pressures of other family 
members or the interference of community leaders. (See www.fco.gov.uk. Caseload 
figure from European Commission/Daphne Project on Female Marriage Migrants (2006) 
‘Gender, Marriage Migration and Justice in Multicultural Britain – Conference Report, 
London, 2006, p10).
xxxi  Danish Government, 2003, p1.
xxxii  Siim, 2006.
xxxiii  Forced marriage has been identified as an increasing problem in several countries. In 
Austria by NGOs such as Orient Express. But another organisation – Peregrina – has 
challenged the idea that the problem is on the increase (Holzleithner and Strasser, 
2006). Le Haut Conseil à L’intégration has estimated that 70,000 adolescents are 
at risk of forced marriage and that the tradition is spreading in France while it is 
declining in the countries of origin (‘Le Figaro’, 8th March 2005). See Rude-Antoine, 
2005, pp22-26 for quantitative figures and/or estimates.
xxxiv  Prins and Saharso, 2006; Coene and Longman, 2006.
xxxv  Holzleithner and Strasser, 2006.
xxxvi  Berghahn and Rostock, 2006.
xxxvii  Skjeie, 2006.
xxxviii  Hellgren and Hobson, 2006.
xxxix  www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article763973.ece See Bredal; 2005, Skjeie, 2006.
xl  The Universal Declaration of Human rights states that ‘Men and women of full 
age…have the right to marry’ and that ‘Marriage shall be entered into only with the 
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